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Review Essays
INTERPRETATION AND PHILOSOPHY:
DWORKIN'S CONSTITUTION*
Edward B. Foley**

"Holmes wrote like a dream," Ronald Dworkin observes in
Freedom's Law, his new collection of essays on constitutional interpretation. (p. 360, n.16) The same thing, of course, can be
said of Dworkin himself. He is a master wordsmith, and these
essays are a great pleasure to read even when they become a bit
repetitive. Most of the essays were originally published in the
New York Review of Books for a general audience without specialized legal training. Accordingly, Dworkin takes care in each
essay to explain the basic issues that confront constitutional theorists. Since he has left these essays largely unchanged from their
original form, we read the same explanation of the basic issues
numerous times before completing the book. No matter. Dworkin is such a good writer that his work can withstand repetition.
Indeed, it is worth reading some of Dworkin's passages out loud.
His prose often sounds like poetry, having the natural rhythm of
iambic verse.
Dworkin, however, is no mere stylist. His words convey
ideas of great importance and intelligence. Many of his insights
are truly brilliant and original, and, having the benefit of them,
one's own thinking about constitutional law is forever changed
for the better. For example, Dworkin's defense of Roe as a right
rooted in the religion clauses, although problematic for reasons
we shall discuss, entirely transforms the debate about Roe.l No
longer is the question simply whether Roe, as an instance of
"substantive due process," represents all the errors of that con* Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American
Constitution (Harvard U. Press, 1996).
•• Associate Professor, The Ohio State University College of Law. Thanks to
Frank Beytagh, Jim Brudney, Phil Frickey, Michael McConnell, Peter Swire, and Mark
Tushnet, all of whom made valuable comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
1. This debate continues, at least as a theoretical matter, despite the Court's decision in Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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tradictory concept. Instead, the issue now is whether Roe really
is any different than any other major First Amendment case, like
the ones involving saluting or burning the flag.
Most important of all, Dworkin's central thesis about constitutional interpretation, or something like it, must be right.
Dworkin's basic claim, which he restates in various ways
throughout these essays, is that constitutional interpretation is
not possible without the aid of political philosophy-without, in
other words, thoughtful consideration about what constitutional
rights citizens of a democratic republic ought to have. Dworkin
contrasts his claim with the belief that a court can interpret the
Constitution without having to engage at all in normative inquiry
about what rights people should have, as if the Constitution's authors had already done all the thinking on this subject and the
only job of judges is to enforce this received wisdom in the lawsuits that come before them.
This belief that normative inquiry is entirely exogenous to
the judicial exercise of constitutional interpretation, although
perhaps prevalent among members of the general public, is obviously naive and dismissed as such by almost all members of the
legal profession. As Dworkin himself points out, (p. 76) even
those, like Bork, who have attempted to articulate a theory of
constitutional interpretation that immunizes judges from considerations of political philosophy have ended by acknowledging
that judges inevitably must make value judgments when they interpret the Constitution. Thus, Dworkin stands essentially unchallenged with respect to his central claim.
Even so, Dworkin's defense of this claim is not entirely persuasive. For reasons I shall discuss, Dworkin himself relies too
much on the text of the Constitution to justify his method for
interpreting the text. As an alternative to Dworkin's approach, I
shall suggest an account of constitutional interpretation in which
the actual language of the Constitution serves as little more than
a potential obstacle to judicial decisions reached independently
by considerations of pure political philosophy. (By "pure political philosophy," I mean the judge's own normative beliefs about
what the Constitution ideally ought to say.) I show why this alternative account better explains and justifies not only Roe, to
which Dworkin devotes much of his attention, but also such important decisions as Reynolds v. Simsz (one-person-one-vote)
and Blaisde[[3 (the mortgage moratorium case), which Dworkin
2.
3.

377 u.s. 533 (1964}.
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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unfortunately ignores. In addition, as a further illustration of the
advantages of this alternative account, I shall discuss the issue of
poverty as a problem of constitutional law, a topic about which
Dworkin is unduly dismissive.
I. DWORKIN THE TEXTUALIST

Dworkin defends his claim that constitutional interpretation
requires reliance on political philosophy by invoking the text of
the Constitution itself. He points to the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses, among others, and says that these clauses are
written in very abstract language and refer to fundamental philosophical values. A court seeking to understand the meaning and
implications of these clauses has no choice but to engage in philosophical inquiry concerning the content of these fundamental
values. For example, what specifically must a state do, or not do,
in order to give everyone within its jurisdiction "equal protection
of the laws"? To answer this question, as Dworkin says, necessarily requires a court to consider philosophically the value of
legal equality. (p. 9)
Dworkin contrasts the abstract provisions of the Constitution with other, much more concrete clauses. As an example, he
points to the Third Amendment, which prohibits the government
from quartering troops in a person's house during peacetime
without consent. This provision, Dworkin observes, does not refer to an abstract and broad fundamental value like privacy or
liberty. Instead, it concerns only the very specific and narrow
problem of housing soldiers in civilian homes. Accordingly,
Dworkin maintains, it would be inappropriate for a court to interpret this specific and narrow provision as protecting some fundamental philosophical value. (p. 8)
Thus, apparently for Dworkin, it is the language of the Constitution itself that ultimately justifies judicial reliance on normative inquiry. The implication of Dworkin's argument is that if the
Constitution were written differently, then there would be no
need for judicial philosophizing. In other words, if the Constitution contained only narrow and specific provisions like the Third
Amendment, and none of the broad and abstract provisions like
the Equal Protection Clause, then there would be no basis for
courts to consider fundamental moral values in the course of constitutional interpretation.
But this text-bound argument is not right. The presence in
the Constitution of the Free Speech and Equal Protection
Clauses makes no difference to the judicial protection of free
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speech or legal equality. Even if the First Amendment had never
been adopted, the courts still would have had to develop the doctrines of free expression.4 Freedom of expression is absolutely
essential to existence of a democratic government, and therefore
a right of free expression is implicit in the Constitution whether
or not the Constitution contains the First Arnendment.s The text
of the First Amendment merely confirms what would be true
even in the absence of the text-just like, as Marshall said in McCulloch v. Maryland,6 the Necessary and Proper Clause merely
confirms what is already implicit in the design of the federal
system.
The same point is equally true of the Equal Protection
Clause. The fundamental idea of legal equality is also an essential element to a democratic regime. Thus, the requirement of
legal equality is implicit in the Constitution even if there is no
Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, in Bolling v. Sharpe7 and subsequent cases, the Court has had to recognize this point, since by
its terms the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to the actions of the federal government.
In sum, judges engage in philosophical inquiry concerning
the requirements of free speech and legal equality not because
the Constitution happens to have clauses that refer to these fundamental values, but rather just because the values are so fundamental. It seems like subterfuge on Dworkin's part for him to
say that judicial reliance on philosophy results from the text
when, in fact, the existence of the text is irrelevant, and the true
ground of judicial decision is the necessity of protecting fundamental values, whatever the text might say. It would be more
forthright for Dworkin to follow the lead of Marshall in McCulloch and acknowledge when the text merely confirms what is
necessary anyway because of independent reasons of political
philosophy.s
4. Indeed, even Bork has expressed this view: "Freedom for political speech could
and should be inferred even if there were no first amendment." Robert H. Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 23 (1971).
5. For precisely this reason, the High Court of Australia has ruled that Australia's
Constitution implicitly protects free speech even though it contains no written Bill of
Rights. See William Rich, Constitutional Law in the United States and Australia, 35 Washbum L.J. 1, 22-28 (1995).
6. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
7. 347 u.s. 497 (1954).
8. There is still the question whether the textual provisions concerning "freedom of
speech" or "equal protection" should entail more than what the philosophically essential
principles of free speech and legal equality would absolutely require in the absence of the
text. My answer is no, because in a democracy the legislature should prevail, unless the
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Dworkin makes his textualist argument because he wants
the mandate for judicial philosophizing to come from the Constitution itself rather than from the judge. "Judges," Dworkin says,
"may not read their own convictions into the Constitution." (p.
10) He fears the charge that judges contravene the limits of their
office if they impose their own moral convictions on law rather
than enforce the moral values embodied in the law itself. Dworkin, of course, is no simple positivist. As we have already discussed, Dworkin's central mission is to discredit the simple
positivistic belief that judges can enforce the morality of the law
without making some moral choices of their own. But Dworkin
shares with the positivists the aspiration that the judge's decisions be somehow rooted in the law itself and emanate from the
authority of the law itself. Dworkin, as much as any positivist,
thinks it wrong for a judge to let the law guide his decisionmaking only to the extent that it conforms to his antecedent moral
convictions. This judicial approach would make the law entirely
subservient to the judge's personal morality, thus negating any
separation between law and morality, a separation which Dworkin is eager to preserve. Even if legal interpretation occasionally
requires reliance on a judge's moral judgments, Dworkin wants
legal interpretation to be a distinct enterprise from pure political
philosophy. It is as important for Dworkin as for the positivists
that the right answer to an issue of constitutional interpretation
not inevitably be the right answer from the perspective of pure
political philosophy.
But this distinction is not so easy to maintain. Suppose,
again, that the Constitution contained no First or Fourteenth
Amendment, indeed no Bill of Rights at all. Suppose, instead,
the Constitution contained the minimum number of provisions
necessary to establish the three branches of government and procedures for amendment and ratification. Even in this situation,
as I have suggested, the judiciary would be justified in declaring
the existence of constitutional rights to free expression and legal
equality (if and when the legislature enacted laws that contravened these fundamental values). In one sense, these judicial
declarations would be pure philosophizing because nothing in the
minimalist text of this hypothetical Constitution even hints at the
existence of these rights. Yet, in another sense, these judicial
declarations can be considered acts of interpretation. A court
could say, for example, that the most basic purpose of any constiessential requirements of justice dictate otherwise-or unless there is no other conceiva·
ble way to construe the words of the text.
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tution, including this minimalist one, is to establish a system of
government that is fundamentally fair to everyone within its jurisdiction. No government is fundamentally fair unless it guarantees freedom of expression and legal equality. Thus, interpreting
the Constitution in accordance with its most basic purpose, we
must presume that the Constitution implicitly protects these fundamental rights.
This example shows that the distinction between interpretation and pure philosophizing is, at best, a fuzzy one. In the case
of the minimalist Constitution, the exercise of interpretation is
essentially equivalent to pure philosophizing. The minimalist
Constitution must be construed to guarantee certain rights nowhere referenced in the text just because pure political philosophy tells us that any fundamentally fair constitution would
protect these rights.
In any event, this kind of constitutional interpretation is very
different from the account of constitutional interpretation that
Dworkin gives us in Freedom's Law. Dworkin would have us
believe that judges engage in philosophical inquiry solely because
the text of the Constitution compels them to do so. "We are governed by what our lawmakers said-by the principles they laid
down," writes Dworkin. (p. 10) But in the case of the minimalist
constitution, the mandate for judicial philosophizing certainly
does not come from the constitution itself. Instead, it comes
solely from the judge's view that the constitution as written
should conform to the requirements of a fundamentally fair constitution, as dictated by political philosophy.
Let me be perfectly clear. I think it is entirely legitimate for
a judge to take this view. But a judge who takes this view is not
acting in accordance with the account of constitutional interpretation that Dworkin describes.9
9. Dworkin also oversimplifies the distinction between interpretation and philosophy in his discussion of natural law. (p. 316) Dworkin says there are two different ways a
judge might rely on natural law. One way would be to say that the Constitution as written
and ratified is contrary to natural law and thus itself invalid. As Dworkin observes, this
argument was sometimes made by abolitionists prior to the Civil War, when the Constitution contained the Fugitive Slave Clause, which guaranteed the return of fugitive slaves to
their slaveowners. The other possible use of natural law, according to Dworkin, is to invoke natural law concepts to elucidate the meaning of the Constitution's abstract clauses.
If natural law would condemn certain forms of punishment as inhumanly cruel, then a
judge could rely upon this determination of natural law in interpreting the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.
But Dworkin's distinction between these two ways of using natural law misses the
possibility of a third, intermediary use. Drawing again upon our example of the ~nimal
ist constitution, we can see that a court could rely upon natural law to detemune what
constitutional rights it should protect, even though the minimalist constitution contains no
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Dworkin might respond that he need not consider the case
of the minimalist constitution because that constitution is not the
one we have today. Our Constitution does contain abstract provisions that refer explicitly to basic civil rights like "freedom of
speech" and "equal protection of the laws." Thus, at least for our
existing Constitution, the mandate for philosophizing does come
directly from the text itself, and hence we need not worry about a
counterfactual hypothetical.
But this response is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First
of all, basic principles of constitutional interpretation should be
valid regardless of how the Constitution is actually worded. After all, fundamental interpretative principles are the tools that a
judge brings to the text. They tell a judge how to read the actual
words of the text. Thus, they cannot come from the words
themselves.Io
Second, and a related point, Dworkin's approach does not
tell us how to handle possible amendments to the text. It is
hardly inconceivable that a future constitutional amendment
might modify one of Dworkin's favored abstract rights. For example, cultural conservatives keep pressing for amendments that
would (1) leave flagburning unprotected by the Free Speech
Clause and (2) remove any Establishment Clause bar to institutional prayer in public schools. If the cultural conservatives get
their way, the effect of their amendments may well depend on
how the Supreme Court understands the status of the constitutional rights protected by the Free Speech and Establishment
Clauses. If the Court considers those rights part of the Constitution solely because the First Amendment refers to them, then the
effect of the new amendments will be to negate those rights pro
tanto. But if the Court recognizes that the First Amendment
merely confirms that freedom of expression and religious equality are essential to the Constitution's very legitimacy, then the
rights-protecting clauses at all. This use of natural law would fall into neither category
identified by Dworkin. It is not the same as condemning the minimalist constitution as
invalid. Nor is it the same as using natural law to elucidate the meaning of a textually
identified, albeit abstract, right (like the right not to be punished cruelly). Thus, here
again, Dworkin fails to recognize the possibility of interpretation that is purely philosophical, with no textual limits at all.
10. To be sure, the Constitution itself might contain rules instructing judges how to
interpret the document. But even these rules of interpretation must be read and construed by judges based on their independent views of how such interpretive rules should
be construed. For example, were the Constitution to contain a clause instructing judges
to construe the Bill of Rights strictly, so as to minimize interference with Congress and
state legislatures, the Supreme Court still would have to decide, in a particular case,
whether to ignore this instruction on the ground that to do so would undermine the legitimacy of the Constitution itself (a consequence to be avoided if at all possible).
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new amendments may not suffice to negate these rights. For example, if a new amendment says only that "The First Amendment shall not be construed to prohibit officially sponsored
prayer in public school," the Court could say that, while this
amendment negates the First Amendment's prohibition on institutional prayer in public schools, it does not negate the prohibition on state-sponsored prayer that is necessarily implicit in any
legitimate Constitution.11 Of course, the cultural conservatives
might eventually get their way by adopting another amendment
that says, "The judiciary lacks any authority to declare an implied
prohibition on officially sponsored prayer in public schools." But
they might not succeed the second time around. And so it matters how we understand the status of the fundamental rights we
now associate with the First Amendment.
Third, and most important, for reasons I shall next explain,
the text of our actual Constitution cannot do all the work that
Dworkin would have it do. The abstract provisions that Dworkin
invokes do not necessarily refer to the fundamental philosophical
principles that Dworkin wants the Constitution to protect. Thus,
at the end of the day, it is still pure philosophy, and not the text
itself, that tells judges what fundamental values they should protect in the name of the existing Constitution.12
II.

DWORKIN'S FAVORITE CLAUSES

Dworkin focuses most of his attention, not surprisingly, on
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. These amendments contain the clauses that, according to Dworkin, refer to the great
abstract moral rights that judges must consider philosophically.
11. Elsewhere I have suggested why it is essential to the fundamental fairness of a
political regime that the government refrain from taking sides in theological disputes
about which people reasonably can disagree. See Edward B. Foley, Political Liberalism
and Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. %3 (1993).
12. In earlier work, Dworkin placed less reliance on the Constitution's text than he
does in Freedom's Law. For example, a decade ago in A Matter of Principle (Harvard U.
Press, 1985), Dworkin belittled the "textualist" view that the text of the Constitution is
binding upon judges just because it was ratified in accordance with procedures that were
generally accepted as valid at the time of ratification. Id. at 36-37. Instead, Dworkin
argued there that the Constitution's text was binding only because two centuries of legal
practice have imbedded it as such. Even this view arguably accords the text more authority than it deserves, since some centuries-old practices might be so unfair as to undermine
the legitimacy of the entire legal system, in which case they should be repudiated despite
their longevity and textual pedigree. In any event, the important issue is not whether the
text is binding, but whether judges properly may supplement the text by declaring the
existence of constitutional rights not derivable from the text itself. In both Freedom's
Law (p. 4) and A Matter of Principle, (p. 35) Dworkin categorically rejects this idea. In
this respect, then, Dworkin has been consistently more text-bound than he should be.
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But it is not so clear that these clauses have the meaning that
Dworkin attributes to them.
I shall first discuss the Equal Protection and Free Speech
Clauses because they raise similar problems. Then I shall discuss
the Due Process Clause, which has special problems of its own.
Finally, I shall consider Dworkin's effort to use the Religion
Clauses as an alternative basis for the right to reproductive
freedom.
Equal Protection and Free Speech. Dworkin recognizes that
"equal protection of the laws" and "freedom of speech" might
well be terms of art that had very narrow meanings to those who
drafted and ratified these clauses.B "Equal protection of the
laws" might mean only that all laws, as written, shall be applied
equally to all who fall within their terms. (p. 9) And "freedom
of speech" might mean, as Blackstone and others said, only no
imposition of prior restraints. (p. 199) But, Dworkin says, these
plausible meanings have been decisively rejected by "unchallengeable precedent." (p. 10)
Having rejected these narrow interpretations on grounds of
precedent, Dworkin goes on to argue that the texts of the Equal
Protection and Free Speech Clauses do not permit distinction between kinds of discrimination or categories of speech. For example, Dworkin discusses the debate about whether the Equal
Protection Clause should protect against other kinds of discrimination besides racial discrimination-e.g., discrimination based
on sex or sexual orientation. Dworkin argues that the text of the
Equal Protection Clause is not limited to race, and thus the
Clause should be interpreted to protect against any discrimination that denies the equal dignity of individuals. (pp. 10, 270)
The same kind of argument, Dworkin says, applies to the Free
Speech Clause. (p. 381 n.7) In criticizing the view that the Free
Speech Clause should be limited to only political speech and
13. Dworkin makes clear that the question whether the framers used terms of art is
very different from trying to ascertain the framers' "original intent," as that concept is
ordinarily used. It is necessary to discover whether the framers used any terms of art
because it is necessary to know the framers' linguistic intent. To use Dworkin's own example, if in the 18th century the word "cruel" meant "expensive," then the Eighth
Amendment would have a very different meaning. (p. 291) In this case, the Eighth
Amendment would forbid only "expensive" punishments because courts are bound by the
framers' linguistic intent. Most advocates of "original intent" interpretation, however, do
not limit themselves to the Framers' linguistic intent. Instead, they argue that judges are
bound by the framers' own understanding of the legal effect of the language they used. In
other words, if the Eighth Amendment barred expensive punishments and the Framers
thought solitary confinement expensive, then their specific understanding of how the
Eighth Amendment would apply to solitary confinement would be binding on judges.
This version of "original intent" theory is what Dworkin emphatically rejects.
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should not extend to pornography, Dworkin claims that the abstract words of the Clause do not support this narrow limitation.
But Dworkin's arguments, although eloquent, are unpersuasive. Let us assume, as Dworkin suggests, that "equal protection" and "freedom of speech" were added to the Constitution as
terms of art, with precise and narrow meanings. In this case,
then, according to Dworkin's textualist approach, it was a mistake for courts in the past to extend the Equal Protection Clause
beyond a requirement of equal enforcement of the laws as written, and the Free Speech Clause beyond a prohibition against
prior restraints. Even accepting these mistakes as binding precedents, it hardly follows that courts in subsequent cases should expand the scope of their previous errors. For example, when first
confronting the issue of sex discrimination, the Supreme Court
reasonably could have said:
Although the most plausible interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause is that it prohibits only discriminatory enforcement of the laws as written, longstanding precedent establishes
that the Clause also prohibits states from enacting laws that by
their terms discriminate on the basis of race. But this precedent need not be extended to encompass other forms of discrimination. On the contrary, there are good reasons
emanating from the Nation's history, including the specific historical circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, to limit the Equal Protection Clause to
racial discrimination.

Likewise, in the first pornography case, the Court could have
written:
We recognize that we have no warrant for interpreting the
Free Speech Clause as anything more than a prohibition on
prior restraints. On the other hand, a solid line of precedent
has interpreted the Clause to prohibit even subsequent punishment for the expression of political beliefs. We will not disturb this precedent, but neither will we extend it to prohibit
punishment for pornography that has no relation to the discussion of political ideas.

Such efforts to limit the force of mistaken precedent are not
at all unprincipled. On the contrary, they rest on the plausible
principle that the Court should do its best to curtail the scope of
any previous misinterpretations of the text. Not only is it more
difficult for Congress to correct misinterpretations of the Constitution than to fix errors of statutory interpretation, but judicial
mistakes that expand the scope of constitutional rights displace
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the authority of legislatures to enact ordinary legislation to that
extent. If the Court will not correct the mistake, because the
weight of precedent is just too great, then the Court will be
forced to develop a new constitutional principle that differs from
the one that was adopted in the text. In this situation, the Court
arguably should adopt a new constitutional principle that does
the least harm to the existing law, which is the narrowest possible
principle that covers the mistaken precedent.
I found in Freedom's Law no theory of precedent to contradict this one. Drawing upon his earlier book Law's Empire,14
Dworkin says that judges must weave together text and precedent into a coherent whole. But it is not clear how judges could
do this, at least in this circumstance, without relying upon something like pure political philosophy. By hypothesis, we are dealing here with a situation in which the judge sincerely believes the
text and precedent contradict one another. The judge is convinced that "the freedom of speech" in eighteenth century usage
meant only no prior restraints, yet knows that precedent has protected political speech from subsequent punishment. In this situation, even a herculean effort by the judge cannot make the text
and precedent add up to a general rule that the expression of all
kinds of speech, sexual as well as political, ought to be protected
from subsequent punishment. Only if philosophy dictates that
this general rule ought to be a component of constitutional law
would it make sense to superimpose this rule upon the contradictory text and precedent. But if this approach is what Dworkin
advocates, as it appears he does, then he might as well acknowledge that text and precedent are not determinative. If philosophy truly dictates that this general rule should be part of
constitutional law, and if a judge truly should be motivated by
this mandate of political philosophy, then the judge will reach the
same result even in the absence of text and precedent. Thus,
Dworkin's reliance on precedent to support his interpretations of
the Free Speech and Equal Protection Clauses is unconvincing.
Due Process. Dworkin also invokes precedent to support his
interpretation of the Due Process Clause, but here reliance on
precedent is even less persuasive. Dworkin, like all students of
constitutional law, knows that "substantive due process" is a contradiction in terms and that the Due Process Clause should have
been interpreted initially to guarantee only procedural protections. But, again, he says that the force of precedent is too great
to overcome, and thus the Due Process Clause must now be un14. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Harvard U. Press, 1986).
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derstood to contain a general substantive guarantee of liberty.
(p. 73)
But this argument is especially weak. The weight of precedent here is not nearly so great as it is in the context of the Free
Speech and Equal Protection Clauses. Indeed, the Supreme
Court once disavowed the idea of substantive due process, when
it repudiated Lochner in Ferguson v. Skrupka,1s only to resurrect
the idea in Griswold and then again Roe. It would not have
wreaked havoc in the law for the Court to have confessed error a
second time and said that the doctrine of substantive due process
is so self-contradictory that it must be abandoned, never to return again.
Of course, repudiation of substantive due process does not
end the inquiry concerning the validity of Griswold or Roe. The
Ninth Amendment, together with Fourteenth Amendment's
Privileges and Immunities Clause, might provide an alternative
basis for justifying these decisions. But Dworkin does not wish
to consider the Ninth Amendment argument because to do so
would be to concede that the right to reproductive autonomy is
an "unenumerated" constitutional right.
Dworkin wants to collapse the well-recognized distinction
between enumerated and unenumerated rights. (p. 76) His motivation is obvious. The philosophical value underlying an
unenumerated right, by definition, has no textual basis and must
be identified solely by the court from its own purely philosophical speculations. Thus, the judicial philosophizing that leads to
the recognition of an unenumerated right lacks the constraints of
judicial philosophizing called for by the interpretation of enumerated rights.
But Dworkin's effort to collapse the distinction between
enumerated and unenumerated rights works only if the Due Process Clause can legitimately be considered to protect a general
substantive right to liberty. Then, as Dworkin correctly says, the
right to reproductive freedom is merely an aspect of the enumerated general right of "substantive due process," just as the right
to burn a flag is an aspect of the more general right to free expression. (p. 80) If, however, substantive due process is a thoroughly discreditable idea, as many believe, then the distinction
between enumerated and unenumerated rights reemerges in full
force.
15. 372

u.s. 726 (1963).
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Religion Clauses. Given all these difficulties, it is no wonder
that Dworkin endeavors to develop the Religion Clauses as an
alternative basis for reproductive freedom. The argument is
profound and subtle, and I can only summarize it here. Essentially, the claim is that contraception and abortion are issues of
conscience about which humans can reasonably differ depending
upon their views on religious questions such as what is life's ultimate purpose. The freedom to follow one's own conscience on
such matters is a right that, according to Dworkin, should be considered part of the free exercise of religion. Similarly, if the government orders everyone to conform to one side's view of these
religious issues, then the government has taken a position on a
religious controversy in violation of the Establishment Clause.
To sustain this claim, Dworkin recognizes that he must distinguish contraception and abortion from other issues of conscience. As he himself says, some religions have advocated
infanticide or ritual sacrifice, but there is obviously no Free Exercise right to act in accordance with these religious beliefs. (p.
107) Dworkin distinguishes abortion from infanticide by saying
that the aborted fetus, unlike an infant, is not a person for purposes of constitutional law. But, as far as I could tell, Dworkin
offers no argument to explain why fetuses are not "constitutional
persons" other to say that "[n]o justice or prominent politician
has even advanced that claim." (p. 87)
In any event, even if fetuses do not count as persons, it does
not follow that women have a right to an abortion as an exercise
of their religious beliefs about life's purpose. As Dworkin himself observes, animals are obviously not persons and yet the government can prevent citizens from engaging in ritual animal
sacrifice, (p. 90)-as long as it does so pursuant to a law that does
not aim specifically at curtailing religiously motivated animal
slaughter.16 Dworkin distinguishes abortion from animal sacrifice by saying that the harm to a women from being denied the
right to an abortion is much greater than the harm to someone
denied the right to engage in animal sacrifice.l7 But it is difficult
to understand how Dworkin can say this. The religious believer
16. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993),
holds that the government cannot punish ritual animal slaughter, even pursuant to a law
that is religiously neutral on its face, if the underlying motive in adopting the law is to ban
a specific religious practice. That decision, however, would not bar any animal protection
law that lacked such a specifically prejudicial animus.
17. Dworkin writes:
States can protect the interests of nonpersons. But it is extremely doubtful
whether a state can appeal to such interests to justify a significant abridgement
of an important constitutional right, such as a pregnant woman's right to control
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may perceive the animal sacrifice as essential to avoid a plague
on his family or perhaps even eternal damnation. If a community
can outlaw cruelty to animals, notwithstanding sincere religious
objections to the law, it is hard to see why the community must
yield to a religious reason for seeking an abortion.
Instead of trying to root the right to an abortion in the Religion Clauses, Dworkin might do better to say that the Constitution must protect this right for the basic reason that women
would be morally justified in disobeying any law that attempted
to prohibit an abortion prior to viability. What woman would
reasonably consent to a regime that did not give her the right to
decide for herself whether she should carry a pre-viable fetus to
term?ts Because the Constitution should be interpreted, if at all
possible, to conform to the provisions of a fair social contract
that all reasonable people would agree upon, the Constitution
should be interpreted to protect the right to an abortion.
This alternative argument is obviously not Dworkin's. It is
much more directly philosophical than he would permit. In addition, for a long time Dworkin has resisted philosophical arguments based on the idea of a social contract among reasonable
citizens.19 And yet I believe that if there is to be a persuasive
argument for a constitutional right to an abortion, it ultimately
must lie in the idea of a fair social contract. No other idea better
captures the visceral sense that a woman, denied this right, would
be morally justified in obtaining an illegal abortion since she
never would have consented to a legal system that denied her
her own body. It can do that only in deference to the rights of other constitutional persons, or for some other "compelling" reason.
(p. 90) And, more generally, Dworkin claims:
A state may not curtail liberty, in order to protect an intrinsic value [as opposed
to some person's interests), (1) when the decisions it forbids are matters of personal commitment on essentially religious issues, (2) when the community is divided about what the best understanding of the value in question requires, and
(3) when the decision has a very great and disparate impact on the person whose
decision is displaced.
(pp. 101-02) (emphasis added) Evidently, Dworkin thinks that while the abortion decision has "a very great and disparate impact" on the women who make this decision, the
decision to engage in animal slaughter lacks a comparably significant impact on the religious adherents who make this decision.
18. Women who know they are morally opposed to early abortions might sign away
the right to obtain an abortion, but only because they have already determined for themselves that they would not exercise this right. No woman uncertain about whether she
would seek an abortion in a particular circumstance would give up the right to make this
decision for herself. Choice under conditions of uncertainty is an integral part of reasonableness, as Rawls has explained. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 48-54 (Columbia U.
Press, 1993) (distinguishing between "rational" and "reasonable").
19. See Ronald Dworkin, The Original Position, in Norma Daniels, ed., Reading
Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls' A Theory of Justice 16 (Basic Books, Inc., 1975).
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final authority over what happens inside of her. In any event,
Dworkin's attempt to locate this right in the Religion Clauses,
without need for direct appeal to social contract theory, is ultimately unconvincing.
III. OMITIED ISSUES
Dworkin's focus on abortion and related issues of personal
autonomy, like the right to die, leads him to neglect some important questions that any general theory of constitutional interpretation must confront. Three questions are particularly pressing
for anyone who, like Dworkin, attempts ultimately to derive the
authority for his theory from the text of the Constitution itself.
First, what justifies the constitutional doctrine of one-personone-vote, given the text of the Fourteenth Amendment? Second,
what justifies Blaisdel1,2o given the language of the Contracts
Clause? Third, how should a contemporary court understand the
language of the Second Amendment?
First. Earl Warren considered Reynolds v. Sims21 his most
important opinion, even more so than Brown.22 This belief
makes sense, for giving people political power gives them the
means to legislate whatever other social reforms they wish. By
mandating one-person-one-vote as a constitutional standard,
Reynolds gave voters in more densely populated districts political
power that they previously had lacked. Their increased political
power enabled them to enact civil rights and other progressive
legislation that malapportioned legislatures had blocked for
years. Thus, Reynolds v. Sims stands as a great victory for the
cause of social justice as well as democratic governance. But was
it justifiable as an interpretation of the Constitution?
In Reynolds itself, we recall, Justice Harlan wrote a stinging
dissent, relying primarily on the text of the Fourteenth Amendment's second section. That section provides that if states deny
equal voting rights to some of their citizens the consequence is
that their share of representatives in the U.S. House of Representatives shall be reduced proportionately. As Justice Harlan
observed, this provision makes it difficult to interpret section one
of the Fourteenth Amendment as insisting upon equal voting
rights for all the adult citizens of a state23.
20. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
21. 377 u.s. 533 (1964).
22. See Archibald Cox, The Court and the Constitution 290 (Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1987).
23. 377 u.s. 533, 589-625 (1964).
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The Court's response in Reynolds was essentially to say that
the principle of one-person-one-vote was too important to the
existence of a legitimate political regime to let this textual difficulty stand in the way. Section two of the Fourteenth Amendment does not completely rule out the possibility that section one
might be construed to require one-person-one-vote. It just
makes this construction extremely implausible. But as long as
there is even the tiniest of cracks with which to pry open the text
and shove in the principle, then the Court should do so, given the
overwhelming importance of the principle.
This argument makes sense to me, but it is obvious that, according to this argument, the principle of one-person-one-vote
does not emanate from the text itself, but instead is imposed
upon a reluctant text because of independent considerations of
pure political philosophy. This approach to constitutional interpretation would permit the text to block a principle of political
philosophy as important as one-person-one-vote only if the text
unequivocally leaves a court with not even the slightest of cracks
into which it can wedge the principle. But the language of section two was not absolutely airtight in this respect, and thus this
theory of interpretation would permit the Court to resort to its
own understanding of pure political philosophy.
While Reynolds is defensible on these grounds, the question
remains whether Dworkin's theory of interpretation can provide
a different defense. Dworkin's theory, unlike this other approach, does not permit the forthright manipulation of text to
serve independent ends determined by pure political philosophy.
Instead, as we have seen, Dworkin's theory requires that the
judge's reliance on philosophy be commanded by the text itself.
Freedom's Law does not specifically discuss the issue of oneperson-one-vote, and this omission is one of the book's weaknesses. But Dworkin does discuss the death penalty as a question of constitutional law, (pp. 300-01) and this discussion
suggests how Dworkin would attempt to apply his theory to the
issue of one-person-one-vote. In discussing the death penalty,
Dworkin responds to the argument that the death penalty cannot
be considered "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the
Eighth Amendment when the Fifth Amendment expressly refers
to "capital" crimes, "jeopardy of life or limb," or the deprivation
of "life" by "due process of law." Dworkin's response to this
argument is that, even though the authors did not consider capital punishment "cruel," if it turns out that the authors were
wrong in this belief, then the Eighth Amendment bars capital
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punishment because it bars all "cruel" punishments, including
those that the framers failed to recognize as cruel. This interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, Dworkin says, does not negate
the language of the Fifth because the Fifth does not insist that
capital punishment is not cruel. Instead, the Fifth Amendment
merely provides what procedures govern capital punishment if it
turns out, as the framers believed, that capital punishment does
not violate the Eighth Amendment.
Dworkin might try an analogous argument with respect to
one-person-one-vote and the first two sections of the Fourteenth
Amendment. According to this argument, section two of the
Fourteenth Amendment merely determines what happens on the
assumption one-person-one-vote is not required by "equal protection." But if a denial of one-person-one-vote is truly a denial
of "equal protection," then section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment mandates one-person-one-vote notwithstanding the
conditional assumption underlying section two.
While this kind of argument makes sense with respect to the
death penalty, it does not work so well in the case of one-personone-vote. The Eighth Amendment at least clearly dictates that
"cruel" punishments are to be forbidden, even if it is not so clear
what punishments are cruel. Moreover, when dealing with the
Eighth Amendment, we at least know that we are dealing with
the category of "punishments," into which the death penalty
clearly falls. Thus, it is hardly farfetched that the death penalty
might violate the Eighth Amendment. All we need to know to
make this determination is whether this form of punishment
should be considered cruel. For this reason, it is plausible to say
that the contrary assumption of the Fifth Amendment should
yield in the face of compelling reasons for thinking the death
penalty cruel.
With respect to one-person-one-vote, however, the Equal
Protection Clause does not refer at all to voting, much less specify whether the idea of universal adult suffrage should entail
equally apportioned legislative districts. Indeed, we have no
good reason to think that "equal protection of the laws" requires
equal voting rights, especially when (as Dworkin concedes) the
language of the clause is susceptible to a much more natural interpretation, which would limit it to a requirement of equal enforcement of the laws as written. Thus, the explicit language of
section two stands as a confirmation that "equal protection of the
laws" has nothing to do with equal voting rights. There is simply
no textual warrant for the Court's attempting to discern how the
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Equal Protection Clause applies to legislative apportionment in
the same way that the Court plausibly could consider whether
the death penalty is a "cruel" punishment.
In sum, Dworkin cannot claim that a requirement of oneperson-one-vote is derived from text in the same way that a prohibition on capital punishment might be. If Reynolds is to be
defended, we need something besides Dworkin's text-based theory of interpretation. We need, instead, something like the approach the Court itself employed in Reynolds, where text acts
only as a potential obstacle to the independently determined dictates of political philosophy.
Second. Blaisdell is the case I most like to teach in my firstyear course in Constitutional Law because it is the case that most
pointedly raises the problem of an undesirable constitutional
right unequivocally protected by the text itself. It is one thing for
a court to interpret a phrase like "freedom of speech" expansively, to mean more than the framers intended to say, because
the court thinks the more expansive reading more desirable. It is
quite another thing, however, for a court to eviscerate the plain
meaning of a piece of text just because the court does not like the
consequences of what it says. Yet that is just what the Court did
in Blaisdell.
The Contracts Clause expressly states that no state shall
"[impair] the Obligation of Contracts." Under the terms of a
mortgage agreement with Home Building & Loan Association,
Blaisdell was obligated to meet a repayment schedule or else suffer foreclosure, as specified in the agreement. The State of Minnesota, however, modified the terms of the contract to give
Blaisdell a longer period of time to repay the loan without suffering the consequence of foreclosure. Despite this suspension of
Blaisdell's repayment obligations, the Supreme Court upheld the
Minnesota law.
Blaisdell has been defended on the grounds that the Framers
included the Contracts Clause in the Constitution because they
thought debt relief laws harmful to the long-term economic
health of the nation. Modem economic science, however, has
shown, to the contrary, that debt relief laws can be beneficial to
the nation's economic health. Thus if the Framers had had the
benefit of this economic knowledge, they would not have included the Contracts Clause in the Constitution, at least in its
undiluted form. A court today, therefore, can be faithful to the
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Framers' general intent in adopting the Contracts Clause, while
at the same time repudiating its literal language.24
This defense of Blaisdell has been persuasive for many of my
more thoughtful students, but it is not a defense on which Dworkin can rely. In Freedom's Law, Dworkin is emphatic in repeating several times that courts are supposed to follow what the
Framers said, not what they intended their words to accomplish.
"We are governed by what our lawmakers said-by the principles they laid down-not by any information we might have
about how they themselves would have interpreted those principles or applied them in concrete cases." (p. 10) Thus, even if the
Framers intended to protect the obligation of contracts from legislative impairment only when this protection would be beneficial
to general economic welfare, that intent is not what they expressed in the language of the clause. Instead, they said that
there shall be no state laws that impair contract obligations. Period. Consequently, according to Dworkin's theory, courts must
invalidate state debt relief laws because of the plain text of the
Contracts Clause, regardless of the economic consequences of
doing so. Perhaps many readers will applaud Dworkin's theory
for this reason, but I consider it a flaw of his theory that it cannot
provide a justification for repudiating the literal text of the Contracts Clause, as the Court did in Blaisdel/.zs
Third. Is "the right of the people to keep and bear Arms"
any less worthy of an expansive interpretation than "the freedom
of speech"? If not, why not? We know that the Second Amendment is susceptible of a narrowing construction, just like the Free
Speech Clause. But we also know that it is capable of a robust,
libertarian interpretation, just like the Free Speech Clause. Indeed, in Dworkin's terminology, the Second Amendment articulates an abstract moral right requiring philosophical elucidation
in the same way that the First Amendment does. Indeed, some
philosophers argue that the right of ordinary citizens to keep
24. See Charles Miller, The Supreme Court and the Uses of History, excerpted in
Brest and Levinson, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials 351
(Little, Brown and Co., 3d ed. 1992).
25. Dworkin's literalist approach to constitutional law in Freedom's Law seems inconsistent with the theory of statutory interpretation developed in Law's Empire. In that
earlier book Dworkin defended the sensible idea that judges may reject a literal reading
of a statute when necessary to avoid unfair results that the legislature presumably did not
intend. (To illustrate this point Dworkin relied on the famous case of Riggs v. Palmer, 22
N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889), where the court held that murder defeats the right to inherit under
the decedent's will, even though the statute of wills contained no such exception.) Surprisingly, no comparable argument concerning constitutional interpretation is evident in
Freedom's Law.
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their own guns in their homes is as essential to the preservation
of a democratic republic and the prevention of dictatorship as the
freedom to speak freely about political issues without fear of
criminal prosecution.26
In light of all this, what justifies giving the Second Amendment a narrow construction at the same time one gives an expansive interpretation to the First? Here, again, text cannot help,
since both amendments are equally susceptible to either narrow
or broad constructions. Reliance on precedent also cannot solve
the problem since the narrow interpretation of the Second
Amendment is not so settled by a series of Supreme Court decisions that it could not be revisited.27
One suspects that the only possible defense for this double
standard lies in the judgment, derived from political philosophy,
that freedom of expression is a good right whereas the right to
keep and bear arms is not. But this use of political philosophy
goes well beyond what Dworkin attempts to justify. As we have
seen, Dworkin attempts to paint a picture in which the Constitution's abstract clauses refer to fundamental values which judges
must elucidate and elaborate upon, using insights from philosophy. He never suggests that judges should second-guess the basic
philosophical choices made by the authors of the Constitution.
Yet such judicial second-guessing is precisely what is necessary
with respect to the Second Amendment.28
Thus, I propose, as an alternative to Dworkin's approach,
that judges should first figure out what the Constitution ideally
ought to say based on independent considerations of political
philosophy and then, if possible, make the actual words of the
Constitution fit these independent considerations. This alternative approach cannot pretend, as Dworkin's tries to do, that the
26. See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics 247 (Yale U. Press, 1989):
In the United States, ... [in its early development] existing military organization
and technology favored the foot soldier armed with the musket and later the
rifle. These weapons were so easily accessible and widely owned that Americans
were virtually a nation in arms. In a quite concrete sense, the consent of the
governed was absolutely essential if there were to be any government at all, for
no government could have been imposed on the people of the United States
over the opposition of a majority.
See generally Sanford Levinson, The Emba"assing Second Amendment, 99 Yale L.J. 637
(1989).
27. The only Supreme Court opinion of any significance is United States v. Miller,
307 U.S. 174 (1939), which upheld an federal prohibition on the movement of sawed-off
shotguns in interstate commerce.
28. Richard Epstein similarly observes that Dworkin never explains why the Takings
Clauses should be treated differently than the Free Speech Clause. See Richard A. Epstein, The First Freedoms, N.Y. Times Book Review 12 (May 26, 1996).
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judge's philosophizing is mandated or even authorized by the
Constitution itself. But at least this alternative approach justifies
a narrowing construction of the Second Amendment. It also justifies, whereas Dworkin's cannot, Reynolds and Blaisdell, two of
the Court's most important decisions of this century.zg
IV. THE CONSTITUTION AND POVERTY
To show that constitutional interpretation has constraints,
Dworkin argues that it would be wrong for a judge to hold that
the Constitution protects the poor from poverty even if pure philosophy insists upon such protection. It is a shame that Dworkin
takes this view, since no constitution worth defending would permit citizens to starve to death, especially if those citizens are willing to work but unable to find jobs. Because nothing in the U.S.
Constitution unequivocally precludes a right to a "living wage,"3o
the Supreme Court should recognize the existence of this right if
ever Congress were to become so inhuman as to let unemployed
citizens starve.31 The Court should recognize this right, in other
words, for the simple reason that basic fairness insists upon it and
nothing in the text stands in the way as an obstacle to its
recognition.
29. In all candor, I should note that I would go so far as to say that, in extreme
situations, judges should protect fundamental human rights even if the Constitution explicitly forbade them from doing so. I have in mind the example of a Nazi-like constitutional amendment that unambiguously prohibited judges from interfering with the
government's program to send certain groups of people to concentration camps. In this
situation I believe judges have a moral obligation, stemming solely from the fact they are
human beings, to use the powers of their office to thwart the Nazi evil. This obligation
alone would justify a judicial decree ordering the release of people from concentration
camps on the ground that the Constitution, to have any legitimacy, must protect the basic
security of all persons. While this judicial disobedience of an explicit constitutional command would signal the breakdown of the existing constitutional regime, I believe that this
breakdown is imperative since otherwise the Constitution would not deserve the allegiance of those it purports to govern. In future writings I shall elaborate and defend this
argument.
30. As I use the term, "living wage" means only enough money to buy enough food
to avoid death by starvation as well as to provide enough shelter and clothing to protect
oneself from inclement weather. In other words, it is the absolute minimum for survival
and falls short of what most Americans would consider the minimum necessary for a
"decent" standard of living.
31. The recent welfare reform legislation enacted by Congress does not necessarily
violate this right. Although the new law ends the federal entitlement to Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC), it still guarantees up to six months of food stamps for
citizens laid off from their jobs. See 54 Cong. Q. 2191 (Aug. 3, 19%). In addition, Congress this year increased the minimum wage to make up for losses caused by inflation and
in recent years has approved several extensions to the unemployment insurance program.
Thus, Congress has by no means repudiated a policy of making sure that everyone has a
decent minimum wage or some other temporary means of support in case one loses one's
job.
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In rejecting this sensible conclusion, Dworkin fails to distinguish between a constitutional right to a living wage and a constitutional right to equal wealth. Dworkin says: "Even a judge who
believes that abstract justice requires economic equality cannot
interpret the equal protection clause as making equality of
wealth, or collective ownership of productive resources, a constitutional requirement, because that interpretation simply does not
fit American history or practice, or the rest of the Constitution."
(p. 11) Of course, a judge should not interpret the Constitution
as requiring equal wealth, but the reason is not that this interpretation would be incongruous with text and tradition. The reason,
rather, is simply that this interpretation would be bad
philosophy.3z
There is a world of difference between a right to a living
wage and a right to equal wealth. The latter cannot possibly be
considered a requirement of basic fairness. Even if the lives of
all citizens are equal in their intrinsic value, it does not follow
that all citizens should have equal wealth or income, since permitting economic inequalities might actually improve the lives of
those with the least (as Rawls and others have observed).33
But the idea of a living wage is not similarly flawed. No reasonable person living in a generally affluent country like the
United States would consent to a system of government that did
not guarantee the availability of a job paying enough income to
feed oneself. Self-preservation insists as much.34 Thus, a fair social contract necessarily would include the right to a living wage,
and since the Constitution should conform to the essential terms
of a fair social contract, it should be interpreted to guarantee this
right.
In sum, yet another reason to reject Dworkin's approach to
constitutional interpretation is that it fails to recognize a right to
a living wage. By contrast, the alternative approach I have sug32. Moreover, the idea that judges should rely on political philosophy, rather than
text, in the exercise of constitutional adjudication does not mean that judges are free to
impose on society their own conception of right and wrong. Sound political philosophy
contains within itself principles of institutional responsibilities, including principles that
require judges to leave cenain matters to the legislative branches of government. This is
a point that Larry Sager stressed in the paper he delivered for the discussion on "Consti·
tutional Tragedy" at the AALS annual meeting in January 1997.
33. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard U. Press, 1971). Moreover, citizens uncertain of their economic fate might be willing to risk some degree of minimum
economic security (as long as the level does not fall too low) in exchange for some chance
of being fabulously wealthy. See James S. Fishkin, The Dialogue of Justice: Toward a SelfReflective Society (Yale U. Press, 1992); Jeremy Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers
1981-1991 at 250-70 (1993).
34. See Waldron, Liberal Rights (cited in note 35).
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gested would recognize this right. Indeed, the very same approach that justifies Reynolds, Blaisdell, and a narrow Second
Amendment also justifies the recognition of this right. This approach gives judges more freedom to philosophize than Dworkin's does, but as long as judges exercise this trust with a
modicum of wisdom, the result will be a Constitution of which we
can be proud rather than ashamed.
CONCLUSION
The observations of this essay must be understood in context. Dworkin is the leading thinker of our time in the related
fields of jurisprudence and constitutional theory, and any criticism of his work is necessarily tempered by an awe and admiration of his many pathbreaking contributions. Moreover, the
criticisms offered here are made by one who is largely sympathetic with Dworkin's efforts to infuse the enterprise of constitutional interpretation with explicit reliance of political philosophy.
My overall evaluation of Dworkin is not that he goes too far in
this regard, but rather that he does not go far enough.
Indeed, readers of this essay may be surprised to find me
criticizing Dworkin for being too much like a positivist and depending too much on the Constitution's text. Dworkin is usually
considered the archenemy of positivists and often attacked for
not placing enough emphasis to the actual language of the enacted law.3s In particular, Dworkin is often viewed as the exact
opposite of Bork, with Bork being seen as the supreme positivist,
who limits himself only to those values identified in the text of
the Constitution.36
But what is most interesting in reading Freedom's Law is
how little actually separates Dworkin from Bork, especially with
regard to their overarching general approach to constitutional interpretation. They may differ passionately on how they apply
this general approach to particular problems. But, despite these
differences in detail, they share essentially the same general interpretive approach, which is that the task of the judge is simply
to determine what philosophical values or principles are ex35. Posner, for example, has said of Dworkin that "[h]is extensive writings evince
little interest in the words of the Constitution." Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 174
(Harvard U. Press, 1995).
36. Posner characterizes Bork as Dworkin's "b~te noire," id. at 173, an assertion
that is clearly justified given the vehemence of Dworkin's opposition to Bork's nomination for the Court. This vehemence is reflected in several of the essays in Freedom's Law,
although, in an introductory preface to these essays, (p. 263) Dworkin confesses that "in
retrospect, I am surprised at the depth of the indignation I expressed over Bork's views."
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pressed by the language of the Constitution. In fact, in his own
review of Bork's book, which is reprinted as one of the essays in
Freedom's Law, Dworkin himself acknowledges that Bork's basic
approach is little different than his own. (p. 299)
The convergence of Dworkin and Bork, however, is not
cause for celebration. On the contrary, we still need a theory
that unabashedly makes more direct use of political philosophy
than either Dworkin or Bork would permit. Judges should not
be afraid to say that the text of the actual Constitution we have
should be interpreted so that it conforms, as far as possible, to
the provisions of an ideal Constitution that would be agreed
upon by reasonable and fairrninded citizens. I have suggested
such an approach as an alternative to Dworkin's theory, but a
thorough defense of this alternative must await another occasion.

